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The logic was generalized by Lamport and Schneider (1984) who noticed that the inference rules for non-atomic language constructs (which enable invariance properties of statements to be derived from invariance proper-165 ties of their components) can be viewed as special cases of simple logical meta-rules that apply to all programming constructs. This, in particular, provides a uniform way to compare a variety of invariance proof methods which were designed for different programming constructs.
We propose a formalization of the syntax and semantics of programs (Section 2) which is abstract enough so as to allow a rigorous definition of GHL (Section 3) and its interpretation (Section 4) in a language independent way. We prove that the proof system of GHL is sound (Section 5) and relatively complete (Section 6) under conditions on the semantics of programs and axiom schemata for atomic actions and definition of the control flow semantics which we formulate independently of any particular programming language.
PROGRAMMING LANGUAGES

Abstract Syntax
A programming language P is a non-empty set of programs. A program is made up of declarations (which we ignore but for the fact that for some programming languages they are used to define the set of states of the program and the meaning of the program variables with respect to these states) and an executable program fragment Z~E PE L.
A program fragment x E L consists of a non-empty finite set y [n] of smaller program fragments or else is an atomic action (in which case y[n] = 0). Hence a program fragment can be understood as a tree with program subfragments as nodes and atomic actions as leaves.
The set of subfragments that make up program fragment 'II is denoted y*f~]. More precisely, the subfragments of a program fragment K are rc itself as well as the subfragments of all the fragments K' E y[x] of n. In particular, the only subfragment of an atomic action is that atomic action itself.
The set of atomic actions that make up program fragment z is denoted en.
For example, the structure of program 7c= (x := 1; y :=2)11(x := 2; y := 1) can be depicted by the tree (The program structure is usually described more precisely using abstract operations (such as ; or 11) between programming constructs. This is not necessary since we are only interested in the set of subfragments of a program fragment. )
More formally, we make the following HYPOTHESES.
(1) Let L be a non-empty set (of program fragments).
(2) Let PC L be a non-empty set (of programs).
(3) Let Y be a non-empty set (of types or sorts) and VP be a set (of program variables) such that Y, V,, and L are disjoint. Let A E (V, -+ Y) be a type assignment (assigning a type A(v) to each program variable v E V,). O<i<m, 7ci+, Er[n,n, for all 06i<n, TC:+IEY[n:n, 7c0=7cb, and rc,,, = n; then m = n and for all i E [ 1, n], ?ri = xi. in [n] when control resides somewhere in rt, including at its entry points and after [n] when control resides at a point immediately following rr, but not in [rr] . Notice that the starting points of rr are considered to be in n but the points at which n: may terminate have to be considered to be outside, but not independent, of rt (lo), (121, (13L (14) , (15).
The meaning (hence, in particular, the states) of a program fragment rc' cannot be understood independently of its context. More precisely, if program fragment rr' is part of a larger fragment rt then all states of rt for which control resides in or after n' are states relevant to rc' (16).
If n: is an atomic action, so that there are no places in rc at which control can reside except at its starting point ( 1 1 ), the execution of n: is possible only when control is at [rr] . When execution of an atomic action rt terminates, control is after [n], ( 17).
When discussing Hoare-style logics, program variables are usually easy to interpret since states are functions assigning to each variable a value from some domain (Apt, 1981) . We do not adopt this ndive point of view which, for example, is not powerful enough to describe precisely the execution stack in Pascal. On the contrary, we will understand a program variable as a function which given a program state returns the value of the variable in that state. This value may be undefined and special constants may be used to denote the undefined value of uninitialized variables. Moreover, since states have a control component, the meaning of a program variable may be different at different program places so that scope issues can be taken into account (18), (19) .
This intuitive understanding of the operational semantics of programs is made precise by the following: HYPOTHESES.
For all ITE P, an operational semantics is a tuple (S, t, at, in, after, v) [a] (s')) (it is possible to execute an atomic action "a" only tf control resides at an entry point of "a." Moreover, after execution of "a," control must reside after "a," that is, at one of the exit points of "a"), From these hypotheses we derive the following theorem which will be very useful later on:
(Execution of an elementary program step inside rt is only possible when control resides in n. Afterwards, control remains in II or resides at a point immediately following n.)
3. THE LOGIC GHL 3.1. The Language of GHL As usual for Hoare-style program logics (Apt, 1981 (Apt, , 1982 ) the formulas of GHL include assertions (or predicates on the values of the program variables and program locations) and asserted programs of the form {P} rt{Q} having the following interpretation (which differs from Hoare's P{rt} Q): if execution is begun anywhere in rc with the assertion P true, then executing rt will leave P true while control resides inside rt and will make Q true if and when S terminates.
Assertions
Let A be a (maybe inlinitary) many-sorted first-order logic, (Feferman, 1974 ).
More precisely, we consider a collection of symbols falling into the following disjoint classes: (24) A set V' of free variables which is partitioned into a set V{ of logical free variables (which may appear in proofs but not in programs) and a set Vi E VP of program free variables (which may appear both in proofs and programs). The sort of free variable x E V' is d(x).
(25) A set Vb of bound variables partitioned into Vf and Vi c V,. The sort of bound variable x E Vb is d(x).
(26) The symbols ZE for identity, v (maybe inlinitary) for disjunctions, A (maybe inlinitary) for conjonction, i for negation, * for implication, 3 existential quantifier, V universal quantifier.
In order to define the class of assertions we introduce as usual: (27) The class of terms of sort s is the least class containing the free variables and individual constants of sort s and the expressions of the form .f(t I , . . . . t,), where n = #f > 0, f: s1 x . . x s, -P s, and the ti are terms of sort si.
(28) The atomic assertions are expressions of the form r(t,, . . . . t,), where the ti are terms of sort sj, r: s1 x ... x s, + b, and n = #r, or of the form t, = t,, where t, and t, have the same sort.
We take for granted the notion of substitution: &w/x) denotes the result of substituting w for x at each occurrence of the free variable x in 4.
(29) The class of assertions is the least class A such that: l A contains all atomic assertions, l A contains 1 P, P =z. Q, P E Q, v 8, A 8 whenever P, Q E A and 0 c A is a set with altogether finitely many free variables occurring in the formulas in 8, l A contains 3~. P(w/x) and VW. P(w/x) whenever x is a variable actually occurring as a free variable in PEA, u' is a bound variable not occurring in P and x and M' have the same sort d(x) = d(w).
In the following we will usually suppress our distinction between free and bound variables so that we refer to 3x.4, x being a free variable in 4, meaning 3w.#(w/x). (However, the distinction between logical and program variables is essential since they have different interpretations.) 
The Formal System of GHL
The basic proof system of GHL consists of a formal system r concerning assertions of A (31) and a formal system H concerning asserted programs of F. r must contain axiom schemata specifying the control flow semantics of program fragments. In Lamport (1980) In the same way, it is hopeless to look for a language independent specification of the effect of atomic actions in H. One can only make very general hypotheses upon the form of such specifications, (37).
Apart from these language dependent axiom schemata, GHL can be defined by simple language independent meta-rules (35), (36), (38) (As noticed by Lamport (1980) and contrary to Hoare's logic, this derivation does not hold for non-atomic actions. For a counterexample we have {x>,O)x:=x+ l;x:=s+2 {true) and ((x=O)*(x>O)), but in GHL we do not have {X = 0 > x := SC + 1; x := x + 2 {true 1, since assuming x=0 at x :=x+ 1 we have x#O after x:=x+ 1.)
Proofs in GHL
(44) A proof of formula @ from a set A of formulas in a formal system 3 is a finite sequence of formulas Y,, . . . . Yn with Y,, = @ each of which is either an axiom of E, a member of A or else follows from earlier !Pi by one of the rules of inference of 3. If there is a proof of @ from A in 3 we say that @ is provable from A in Z and write Al-,@.
In particular, when A is empty we write h5 CD.
ExampIes of Proofs in GHL
We give a number of very simple (meta-) proofs which will be useful later. We leave implicit the fact that they use tautologies, equality axioms, modus ponens,... of z: Cd) Lamport and Schneider's (1984) decomposition principle, we do not only require that the atomic actions of n: are just the atomic actions of the rri together. We also require that the rri be subfragments of rc. Otherwise the inference could be incorrect as shown by the following counterexample, where I is a = 0, rr, is y := 1, rc2 is y := 0; a :=y and rc is y := 0; .v := 1; a :=y so that cz[nl =a [~,] ua[n,l, {I} rr,{Z} and {I} rrt,{Z} are true but (I} n{Z} is not).
Proof: Let us inductively build a (syntactic) tree of 7c as follows:
. Initially, n: is the root of the tree. l At each step, add to all leaves n' of the tree which are not among n(I, ..., n, their immediate descendants ~[rc'J.
By hypotheses (4a), (4b), and Koening's lemma the resulting tree is finite.
We now prove that all leaves in this tree are among n,, . . . . rr, so as to be able to later prove (48) by induction using a traversal of the tree in postfixed order.
To prove that all leaves in the tree are among rc,,..., rc, we proceed by reductio ad absurdum. Assuming that 71' is a leave not in rc,, . . . . rrn we construct two different chains n, r-c',, . . . . rc',-,, z' and n, ny, . . . . rck-,, rc' in contradiction with hypothesis (4~).
To define the first chain, observe that by the construction process x' E y* [7r] and y [[n'n = @ so that by (6), 7~' E a[xJ.
Since a[[~] G lJ:=, a[nJ, we have rr'~a[rc~J for some in [l, n] . Since rc'~a[rrJ and rci~ y*[xJ, there is by definitions (5) and (6) a chain of the form 71 = ?rb, . ..) Jr; = Jr;, . ..) r$ = rr' such that k <p (since otherwise rcII, = n') and such that 7(;. E y[[n;. + J forj = O,..., p -1. To define the second chain, observe that by the tree construction process there is a chain of the form n = 7c;, . ..) I$ --rr' such that n, # rry for Z = 0, . . . . m (since otherwise by the construction process rck = rci and again nj = rc') and r$ EY[[$'+ II for j = 0, . . . . m -1. The fact that the two chains rr, rr; ,..., 7~;~ r, rc' and rc, lt;, . ..( r$ _ ,, rr' are different (since rri belongs to the first and does not appear in the second) is contrary to hypothesis (4~) so that by reductio ad absurdum we have proved that all leaves in the tree are in n,, . . . . rc,.
We can now built the proof of {I} n {I} as follows: Initially we have {I} 7ci{Z}'for i= 1, . . . . m and treated all leaves of the tree. At each step we treat a node TI' such that its sons 7~" E Y[rr'J have already been treated. Unless we are done (n' = n) this choice is always possible because we have a finite tree and so each node has a finite number of sons. Hence from {I} 7c"{ Z} for all rc" E y[n'n and (38) we derive {I} X'(Z). This algorithm terminates because the tree is finite so that at the root we have proved 10 7w I ON THE SOUNDNESS AND COMPLETENESS
OF GHL 177
Let us give two.additional proofs in GHL, about sequential and parallel composition, which show how to extend GHL to particular programming constructs:
(49) Sequential composition.
Assume IZE P, y[rz, ; x2] E r*[Z7J and ~171,; d = {n,, x2} then
The above processes can communicate only using shared variables. In order to consider CSP-like programs, we must also consider sending actions L'c L (such as Pi ! e in CSP) and receiving actions L' E L. Some sending and receiving actions match to perform channel communications LlClCXLcGL.
Since sending and receiving actions of a parallel program r-c, I( 7c2 cannot be executed separately they are not considered as subfragments of zr II rr2. To do so they have to be grouped into matching pairs performing channel communications.
Therefore,
Applying the decomposition principle we can prove {I} rcr 11 rc2(Z} by first considering the concurrent program without any communication over channels (or equivalently consider operations of zu L' as "halts"):
and then, considering channel communications in a cooperation proof, 
INTERPRETATION OF GHL
So far the formulas of GHL are simply finite strings of symbols. We now assign a meaning to formulas of GHL. This is done by defining a satisfaction relation +, I$ between interpretations I of logical symbols and programs on the one hand and formulas 4 of GHL on the other.
An interpretation I of GHL for a program Z7 E P is a pair (M, S) where:
(51) M is a set-theoretic structure of A (which assigns an appropriate meaning to the logical symbols of A).
(52) S = (S, t, at, in, after, v) is an operational semantics of program 17 (satisfying hypotheses (7) to (19)). We can now define, by induction on the complexity of terms, the interpretation of a term t of sort s as a function Z(t) We make a distinction between logical and program variables: logical variables are understood with respect to logical assignments whereas program variables are understood with respect to program states. Contrary to Apt (1981) we do not identify assignments and states because the meaning of logical variables is always static whereas the meaning of program variables may be dynamic, that is, depends upon the control part of the states.
Interpretation of Asserted Programs
For all P, Q E A, n E y* [IZl and assignment 6 we define the satisfaction relation: {P} z{Q} means that if control is anywhere in 71 (see (20)) and P holds, then executing one step in rr will either leave control in n with P true or leave control at an exit point of K with Q true. This also holds when considering any number of steps as shown by the following:
Proof. By definition: (74) tfn]* = VnZO t[n]", where
Therefore for n = 1, (b) obviously implies (a). Reciprocally, according to (74) we just have to prove (by induction on n) that (a) implies In particular when P = Q = Z, {I} rc{ Z} means that a step, hence any number of steps of rc leaves Z invariant.
Proof: (72), (20). 1
ProoJ: One essentially has to prove by induction on n > 0 that
Remark. Instead of choosing (72) as definition of the interpretation of asserted programs in GHL, we could equivalently and following Lamport and Schneider (1984) 
SOUNDNESS
Let Z be an interpretation of GHL for a program ZZE P. The purpose of this paragraph is to show that no provable formula of GHL is incorrect with respect to Z.
Since we have left r partly unspecified and given a meta-formal system for GHL, this correctness condition can only be proved under the assumption that the unspecified part of z is sound and that the particular instances of the meta-axiom schemata are valid. (87) With these hypotheses the classical soundness proof for z can be easily adapted to handle assignments and states which play similar roles. Moreover, the soundness of (32) follows from (1 1 ), (84), (12); the soundness of (33) follows from (13) (85); the soundness of (34) follows from (14) (15), (86).
We now consider the soundness of proof system H. We need hypotheses about the meta-axiom schemata (37).
HYPOTHESES.
For all 7c E y* [Z7j and a E cl[nJ we assume (88a) Either (37a) E H and for all Q E A and assignments 6, (88b) or (37b) E H and for all PE A and assignments 6, The soundness of H can be proved independently of the soundness of t provided all assertions of A which appear in the proof are assumed to be valid: (89) Soundness of H: VA&A, P, QEA.
A+, (P) n(Q) =W=,{P) n(Q).
Proof. One, proves, by induction on n that if \cI1, . . . . $, is a proof of {P} X{ Q} from A in H then k I { P} z{ Q}. This amounts to the proof that the axiom schemata of H are valid and that the inference rules preserve the truth under I of the asserted programs. Hence by case analysis, we have The same way one can prove (91) i4w+edw Wa) I=, {PWal(Q)} 4Q>
oV'6,Vs,s'~S [a] . 11, by (17h (14) -+ (88a)
by (81), (72), (17), (14) -c= (88b). wwkn.
k-m w)) o(vx'Ey~~n, v/6, vs, s'ES~~'n .(t=Iz[d, s] A tc~'n(s,S'))~C=.,z[S,S']), by (811, (77) .
o(~~'~y~R~,~6,~s,s'~~~~'n,~~~crjrn'n.
(i=,Z[h $1 A tUdl(s, s'))=' i=,Z[h s'lh by (9) o (v~EJJ~~L~~~,~~,s~E s[dph2E~pdn. (20) o (v~'~y[r71n, v'6, v~~crITn'n, vs, s'~{s~Si[~c'nIin%ulj(s) v after [ul] (s) .
o (vrr'Ey~~n, v6, vu~~~~'n, vs, s'~S[run. ( '11, by (16) [uJ(s') v afterCdl(~'H)~ kJC& ~'1)~ by (161, (6) o(v6,v~~cr~~n,vs,~'~~[[~lj. hI
* I= JCh ~'11, by (9) * I=, (1) 4% by (77), (80). (94) Locality rule: by (811, (721, (791, (661, (16) 
(97) Left identity rule: The soundness proof is similar to the above one (using (67) instead of (66)).
(98) Left consequence rule:
((R*P)EA * l=,{f'> u(Q), =-(l=AR*P) * I=#'> 4Q>), since /= ,A by hypothesis and (80) o (vs, vsES[r17n.(~, R[6, sl) 
by (791, (661, (72) 
0 k,(R) 4Q>, by (72) In fact, this cannot be proved in GHL without considering a particular programming language and the corresponding instances of the meta-axiom schemata (37a) or (37b) for all atomic actions or else without assuming the completeness of these meta-axiom schemata.
For all 71 E y*[Z7] and a E cc[x] we assume (99a) Either (37a) E H and for all Q E A and assignments 6, (99b) or (37b) E H and for all PEA and assignments 6,
Notice that in the case of Hoare's (1969) logic hypothesis (99a) is satisfied (since, e.g., for assignment commands PRE is the weakest precondition). However, there are two other causes of incompleteness:
(a) Because of the consequence rule, one has to rely upon r which, by Kurt Godel's second incompleteness theorem, cannot be consistent, contain arithmetic, and be complete. For this reason, the best one might hope for would be to prove relative completeness of H, that is, (b) Unfortunately in the case of Hoare's logic even this cannot be proved. This is because the necessary intermediate assertions (more precisely loop invariant assertions) may not be expressible in the assertion language A (Wand, 1978) . Fortunately this is not the case in GHL because whenever )=,{P}rr{Q} hotds, P is invariant for 7c (72), hence P is invariant for loops in rc (73). Consequently, and contrary to Hoare's Logic, no loop invariant assertion (stronger than P) is needed in the relative completeness proof (which can be carried out without assuming Cook's expressiveness condition (Cook, 1978) ):
(100) HZ) 44 * {~-w=,~~ +Hvl OVA. We can now give the relative completeness proof. a[zJ is finite and for all uea[rcjj we have either Cc) {PREU~IV)) a{z>, by Wa) (d) {zb{zj, by (a), (cl, (43) or (e) {~~4POSTU~llV)}~ by W'b) . ( k,((in[n] 5 P) A (aftergnn a Q)) [h, S] A mm ~7) => l=I((wInn *PJ A (4WI~cll =Q)Kk s'l),
by (20), (14), (61), (62), (66), (64) * k,(((dI~li *PI A (&erUnIi * Q))) n{((Nl~ll *PI A (&erk~II *Q))) (77) * {~Wl=,~~ +Hwmd +p) A WW~n *Q))> ~(Wblj *P) A (dWInli = Q,,}, by (l(Jo) *{R4k,N 4Pl n(Q), by (47). I One should not conclude from the fact that relative completeness (101) has been proved without assuming an expressiveness condition a la Cook that GHL is complete in a stronger sense than Hoare's (1969) logic. More precisely, if using GHL we had to prove P(n) Q in the sense of Hoare, we would have to find a program invariant I such that: and but now, as it is the case for Hoare's logic, no such I might belong to A (except when, but this is not necessary, A is expressive relative to Z and P in the sense of Cook (1978) .
CONCLUSION
We have shown that GHL is a meta-formal system for proving invariance properties of programs which (contrary to Hoare's logic) can be developed (to a large extent) in a programming language independent way. This interesting property allowed us to prove soundness and relative completeness without having to consider a particular language (as in Apt, 1981 ) for Hoare's logic).
As shown by the relative completeness proof, the central idea of GHL is to use a single global program invariant, which has to be shown to be left invariant by each atomic action of the program. In most other proof methods, this global invariant would have to be decomposed into local invariants attached to particular program points (or particular values of the control state). The essential difference between these other proof methods is only that different decompositions are used (Cousot, 1980) . The advantage of GHL, as shown by Lamport and Schneider (1984) , is that, using control predicates, these local invariants can be factored into a global invariant so that the corresponding proof method can be explained in terms of GHL. The disadvantage of GHL is that no decomposition of the global invariant is enforced so that no guideline is offered to the programmer for expressing properties of his program in a simple way.
